Revisiting the Question of How Putin's Regime May Be Defeated
Update to 18 April 2024 essay "Can Putin's Regime Be Defeated? If So, How?"
On April 18, 2024, six months into Russia’s Donetsk offensive, which had begun in October 2023 and continued more or less uninterrupted, I conducted a back-of-the-napkin analysis aimed at answering a central question: What level of Russian casualties would approximate the same degree of societal harm that Tsar Nicholas II inflicted on the Russian Empire from 1914 to 1917? Using casualty data, population estimates, and standard-of-living comparisons, I sought to infer a rough casualty threshold that could lead to systemic instability in modern Russia—paralleling the conditions that led to the February Revolution of 1917.
Examining the historical context of the Russian Empire, which had an estimated population of 170 million in 1914, it became apparent that military losses, economic strain, and social upheaval had combined to trigger the collapse of Tsarist rule by 1917. By calculating military losses as a percentage of total population, I estimated that the critical mass of war casualties needed to provoke regime collapse was around 1.175 percent of the total population (adjusted by modern standard of living). Applying this model to modern Russia, with its population of approximately 143.4 million, the equivalent threshold would be 1,684,950 casualties. If Ukraine could inflict such losses, it could conceivably replicate the level of societal distress that contributed to the downfall of the Tsar.
At the time of my original analysis in mid-April 2024, Ukraine’s reported Russian casualties stood at 455,340, roughly 0.3 percent of Russia’s total population. The daily casualty rate then was estimated at 580 per day, which meant that reaching 1.684 million casualties at that pace would take 2,120 days, or about 5.8 years, pushing the collapse horizon to sometime in 2029. Given that projection, it seemed that Putin’s regime was structurally capable of sustaining the war long enough to avoid immediate systemic collapse. However, in less than a year, the trajectory has shifted dramatically.
By February 3, 2025, Ukrainian estimates place total Russian casualties at 841,660. This figure represents not only a staggering increase but also marks the halfway point to the projected collapse threshold. More significantly, the daily casualty rate has surged to over 1,300 per day, more than doubling from April 2024. At this accelerated pace, Russia could reach the 1.684 million casualty threshold within 650 more days, meaning that the expected timeline for collapse has moved forward from 2029 to late 2026. If the casualty rate continues to rise, collapse could come even sooner.
The sharp increase in Russian casualties likely stems from several factors. Russia’s intensifying offensive strategy in Donetsk has consumed vast manpower since October 2023, leading to poor operational outcomes and massive losses. Desperation for battlefield gains ahead of the 2024 U.S. elections may have led to greater risk-taking at the strategic level. At the same time, the quality of Russian recruits has continued to decline, with Moscow increasingly relying on poorly trained conscripts, prison recruits, and irregular forces. These forces have proven highly vulnerable to Ukraine’s refined defensive strategies, further amplifying Russian losses.
Another emerging factor is the introduction of North Korean troops into the conflict. Recent reports indicate that North Korean soldiers deployed in Ukraine are performing better than their Russian counterparts, suggesting that Moscow is outsourcing combat roles due to mounting manpower shortages. If this trend continues, it could further strain Russia’s ability to sustain its own military forces over the long term. Meanwhile, despite continued ambiguity from Washington, Ukraine has maintained its defensive lines and inflicted severe losses on Russian forces. The integration of advanced weaponry, drone warfare, and artillery strikes has made Russia’s mass assaults increasingly unsustainable.
A crucial question now arises: is Russia approaching a breaking point? One significant difference between Tsarist Russia in 1917 and Putin’s Russia in 2025 is the strength of the internal security apparatus. While the Russian Imperial government collapsed under the weight of protests and military rebellion, Putin’s regime, so far seems more adept at suppressing dissent. However, no state is immune to collapse when subjected to prolonged military and economic attrition.
The strain on Russia’s manpower is undeniable. If the current rate of Russian casualties persists, Moscow will struggle to sustain combat operations without full-scale mobilization. A second wave of mass conscription could provoke internal resistance, particularly among urban elites who have largely avoided the draft so far. Meanwhile, the economic burden of war continues to escalate. The Russian economy faces immense pressure from sanctions, declining oil revenues, and the costs of sustaining military operations. If Ukraine continues targeting Russian logistics infrastructure, the financial strain could become unbearable.
Beyond economic and military pressures, political fragmentation within the Russian elite could hasten the regime’s downfall. The Prigozhin mutiny in 2023 revealed cracks in the Kremlin’s power structure. As battlefield losses mount and economic pain deepens, Putin’s grip on power could weaken further, creating openings for internal challengers. Whether these fractures manifest in a coup, an elite rebellion, or mass protests remains uncertain, but the likelihood of internal destabilization grows with each passing month.
For Ukraine, the strategic implications are clear. Sustaining high Russian casualty rates remains critical, as it accelerates Russia’s path toward military and political exhaustion. In addition to battlefield attrition, Ukraine must continue targeting logistical infrastructure and high-value assets to amplify economic strain. Ensuring steady Western military support is essential, as prolonged aid will make it increasingly difficult for Russia to outlast Ukraine in a war of endurance. When internal fractures appear within Russia, Ukraine must be ready to exploit those vulnerabilities, whether through information warfare, diplomatic maneuvering, or military action.
A year ago, I estimated that it would take until 2029 for Ukraine to impose World War I-scale harm on Putin’s regime. Instead, Ukraine has already reached 50 percent of that threshold in early 2025, and if current trends hold, the full threshold could be met by late 2026. The question is no longer whether Ukraine can inflict the necessary damage but rather whether the Russian system can endure it.
History suggests that no state, no matter how repressive, can sustain this level of military and economic pressure indefinitely. If Ukraine maintains its strategy and secures continued Western support, the collapse of Putin’s regime is no longer a distant possibility—it is an emerging reality.