Germany at a Crossroads: Can the Nation Truly Break from 30 Years of Appeasement and National Security Neglect?
Response to "Germany's chancellor candidates face off in 4-way debate | DW News" by "DW News" YouTube Channel
I hope that Germans understand that, after 30 years of German national and foreign policy neglect of defense, and appeasement of Russia, doing what now needs to be done for your own safety, as well as that of your neighbors and humanity more broadly, is not going to be easy. It will impact your society in ways that German citizens will inevitably feel—whether through higher taxes, reduced social benefits, increased prices, or other ripple effects stemming from increased defense spending, militarization, and shifts in national policy priorities.
Perhaps even more significant are the necessary cultural transformations required for Germany to become a meaningful contributor to something like a European Army, a topic I addressed in an essay here:
Zelenskyy's call for a European Army is a call for German leadership—will Germany answer?
Few would dispute that German foreign policy from the early 1990s to the early 2020s was marked by military neglect, economic dependence on Russia, and in many cases appeasement of Russia. The full picture is, of course, more complex than this simple summation, but the fact remains: a great deal of time and effort has gone into making Germany unprepared for the geopolitical crisis that has been brewing since at least 2014 (if not 2005) and which escalated dramatically in 2022.
Over the past 20 years—since Putin's 2005 State of the Nation address, where he called the Soviet Union's collapse "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century"—Germany's response to Russia has been marked by denial, inertia, hesitation, and, at times, outright appeasement. This occurred under both the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), parties that are supposedly less pro-Putin than the objectively pro-Putin Alternative for Germany (AfD), yet consistently pursued policies that deepened Germany’s economic dependence on Russia and avoided confrontation.
For those of us outside Germany, observing from a distance, one question has been impossible to ignore: Will German leadership finally rise to the challenge and fulfill its potential as Europe’s leader in standing up to Putin—or not? I sincerely hope so. But the cultural, social, political, legal, and ideological barriers to that happening remain pervasive, diverse, and deeply ingrained.
A major AfD victory would make the answer to that question painfully clear: no.
The AfD’s Contradictions: Nationalist or Putinist?
An objective appraisal of the AfD’s domestic policies—particularly immigration control, cultural preservation, economic protectionism, and energy pragmatism—reveals that the party taps into real grievances that mainstream German leadership has long ignored.
Whether one agrees with their proposed solutions or not, the AfD's rise is not happening in a vacuum. Their increasing electoral power reflects real political, economic, and cultural frustrations that many Germans feel.
However, the AfD’s explicitly pro-Putin stance crosses an unacceptable line. Their policies undermine Germany’s sovereignty by advocating subordination to Russia, an imperialist regime that seeks to dominate Europe by force.
The AfD’s position on Russia is irreconcilable with the very cultural and nationalist ideals they claim to uphold. No genuine nationalist movement can support economic and strategic dependence on a foreign autocrat—let alone one who wages genocidal wars, crushes national identities, and imposes authoritarian rule on its own people.
The AfD's hypocrisy is self-evident:
One cannot claim to defend national sovereignty, German cultural heritage, law & order, and economic self-sufficiency while simultaneously advocating for submission to an imperialist dictatorship that seeks to reshape Europe in its own image.
A pro-Putin German government would be catastrophic.
But let’s be honest: the "not-so-pro-Putin" establishment of the past 30 years hasn’t done much better.
Decades of Neglect and Appeasement
Following German reunification in 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Germany—like many other European nations and even the U.S. to some extent—significantly reduced military expenditures and downsized the Bundeswehr. However, Germany became uniquely reliant on NATO and the U.S. for its security in a way that far exceeded most of its European neighbors. As Europe’s largest economy, Germany had the resources to maintain a strong defense, yet it pursued deep military cuts while expanding economic ties with Russia. Unlike France and the U.K., which retained independent nuclear deterrents, Germany remained fully dependent on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and allowed much of its conventional military capability to atrophy.
By the 2010s, the Bundeswehr had become one of the least combat-ready militaries among NATO’s major economies, with a shrinking force structure, outdated equipment, and severe operational limitations—a situation arguably worse than that of the U.K., France, or even some smaller NATO states. Germany's defense spending consistently fell below NATO’s 2% GDP guideline, dropping to as low as 1.1% of GDP in some years. Even when funding was available, reports throughout the decade exposed bureaucratic inefficiencies, logistical failures, and military unpreparedness. By 2014–2015, large portions of Germany’s tanks, aircraft, and naval forces were effectively non-operational due to budget cuts, mismanagement, and a deep-seated anti-militarist political culture that permeated leadership. Despite Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and its annexation of Crimea in 2014, Germany continued to treat defense as a secondary concern.
It is worth noting that these self-defeating policies did not emerge from the pro-Putin AfD—which was founded in 2013 and thus had no influence on prior decisions—but from successive coalition governments comprising the CDU/CSU and SPD. These parties now seek to position themselves as champions of Ukraine.
Over the past two decades, Germany deepened its dependence on Russian energy. This relationship began in the 1970s and intensified with the completion of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline in 2011. Nord Stream 2, approved in 2015, was intended to further increase this dependence but was suspended in 2022 due to geopolitical tensions. By early 2022, Germany imported 55% of its natural gas from Russia, a significant increase from previous decades.
The deliberate policy of energy dependence, pursued by the CDU/CSU and SPD coalitions, is what placed Germany in the precarious position it has slipped into over the past 30 years, but which became undeniable as of 24 Feb 2022.
This dependence on and subordination to Moscow gave Putin immense leverage over Germany and the broader EU, undermining Europe’s ability to impose real consequences for Russian aggression. Even today—18 years after Putin’s 2007 Munich speech, where he condemned NATO expansion and signaled a more confrontational stance toward the West—more than a decade after the annexation of Crimea, and nearly three years into the full-scale invasion of Ukraine—Germany still imports a significant volume of Russian commodities. Many German companies have simply rerouted trade through intermediaries like Kazakhstan, allowing Russia to continue benefiting from economic ties with Germany despite official sanctions.
Thus, while many NATO members reduced defense spending after the Cold War, Germany’s cuts were among the most extreme and carried the greatest consequences. This was not just a case of post-Cold War downsizing but a deliberate structural and political choice that left Europe’s most powerful economy strategically unprepared for the crisis now at hand. This is why Germany’s shift toward rearmament in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is being so closely watched—not simply as a matter of national defense, but as a test of whether Germany is finally willing to assume the military responsibility it has long deferred.
A Long Record of Soft Responses to Russian Aggression
Germany’s "soft" response to Russian aggression began in 2008 with the Russo-Georgian War. In response to this, German Chancellor Angela Merkel opposed NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine, largely to "avoid provoking Russia."
When Putin annexed Crimea in 2014, Germany played a key diplomatic role in mediating European responses, but its economic ties with Russia remained largely intact.
Even after Russia invaded Ukraine and seized Crimea, Germany doubled down on energy dependence by pushing ahead with Nord Stream 2—effectively rewarding Russia’s aggression.
From 2014 to early 2022, Germany repeatedly refused to send lethal aid to Ukraine. For eight years, as Russia waged war in the Donbas, Germany clung to platitudes and excuses, citing concerns over "escalation" and "historical responsibilities."
When Putin escalated to full-scale invasion in 2022, Germany initially offered 5,000 helmets—an embarrassing and widely mocked response to a war of existential survival.
Since 2022: Changes, but Still Not Enough
After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Germany did change course. The announcement of a "Zeitenwende" (historic turning point) and a €100 billion fund to modernize the Bundeswehr were seen as significant.
Germany increased arms deliveries to Ukraine and finally began meeting NATO’s 2% GDP defense spending goal after decades of failing to do so.
But has Germany truly reversed 30 years of appeasement? Or has it merely reduced the degree of appeasement?
Even since 2022, Germany’s leadership has been hesitant, reluctant, and slow to act. The pattern of waiting, debating, and under-delivering on support for Ukraine remains apparent.
The Road Ahead
The road ahead is difficult. The price of correcting 30 years of mistakes will not be small, easy, or painless.
If Germany truly wants to lead Europe in standing up to Russian imperialism, then it must:
Radically transform its strategic culture to take defense seriously.
Sustain and increase defense spending over the next two decades.
Fully sever economic dependencies on Russia, both direct and indirect.
Support Ukraine in total victory rather than seeking "compromise" with Putin.
Germany can rise to this challenge. But only time will tell if it will.